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Clark: Bankruptcy Law

BANKRUPTCY LAW

IN RE MITCHELL: STANDARDS OF
VALUATION IN CHAPTER 13
PROCEEDINGS UNDE~ 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In

re MitchelP marks the first examination by a circuit
court of valuation standards used hi Chapter 13 proceedings to
establish the value of a creditor's secured claim in a vehicle. II In
Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit held that the standard to be applied
in most cases is a vehicle's wholesale values and that any other
standard, such as retail value, should be applied only where the
debtor ~ses a vehicle as part of a going concern." This note will
show that the Mitchell majority arrived at its rule by grounding
its analysis in well-settled bankruptcy philosophy& and by
.1. In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.) (per Schroeder, J., with whom Goodwin, J.,
joined; Noonan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992).
2. Id. at 560. While its immediate concern was the valuation of a car, Mitchell
should apply to most cases where valuation standards are at issue and the debtor proposes to retain the property which has been used as collateral to secure an indebtedness.
See In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1991), infra notes 116-26 and accompanying
text; but see In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, _ U.S. _,
1992 WL 303365 (Dec. 7, 1992), infra note 55.
The Bankruptcy Code does not use the terms secured or unsecured "creditors."
Rather, it refers to creditor's "claims" against a debtor as either secured or unsecured. 11
U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5863, 6312; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854. The term "claim" is defined as a right to payment or a
right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a
right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988).
3. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560.
4. Id.; see also In re Wabash Valley Power Assoc., 77 B.R. 991 (Bankr. S.D. In.
1987). For the Ninth Circuit's definition of going concern, and a comparison with other
commentators' definitions, infra note 107.
5. Commentators and courts have identified two primary purposes of bankruptcy
law. First, bankruptcy hopes to provide debtors with a "fresh start" through a discharge
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strictly construing the structure of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) in accord
with its legislative history.s
II. FACTS
Mitchell's7 facts revolve around the commonplace purchase

of a new family car. On January 14, 1987 George and Carol
Mitchell signed a conditional sales contract for a 1987 Cadillac
EI Dorado. s They paid a $5,000.00 down payment and agreed to
pay sixty monthly installments of $585.00 plus an annual interest rate of eleven percent. s Thus, upon full performance of the
contract, the Mitchells would pay $31,940.00 for the Cadillac. 10
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (hereinafter "GMAC")
claimed that pursuant to the contract, it retained a security inof indebtedness. Second, bankruptcy law tries to create an equitable arrangement of the
rights of creditors where there are not enough assets of a debtor to be distributed in full
satisfaction of all creditors' claims. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 754, 659 (1991) (quoting
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934»; In re Stewart, 14 B.R. 959, 961
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Mensch, 7 B.R. 805, 806 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also
In re Britton, 950 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1991); H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
n (1973); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 117-18, 125 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6077-78, 6086; THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 3-4, 225-52 (1986); see also generally Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start
Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985).
6. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 11 506.03, at 506-5 to 506-14 (15th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 3 COLLIER); infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text discussing the legislative history
of Section 506(a).
7. In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992).
8. Id. at 558.
9.Id.
10. Id. The purchase price included accessories and a sixty-month, unlimited mileage mechanical service contract. A debate outside the scope of this article arose in
Mitchell over this service contract. General Motors Acceptance Corporation contended
that the value of the contract added to the value of the car, thus it should be included in
the car's value under any standard of valuation. Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-28,
Mitchell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.) (No. 90-15952),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief).
In opposition, the Mitchells argued that the service contract was not the proper
subject of a security interest under either California law or the Bankruptcy Code, that at
trial GMAC failed to claim a security interest in the service contract, its premiums or
proceeds, and that GMAC failed to assert that the value of the service contract enhanced
the value of the vehicle. Appellees' Responding Brief at 44-47, Mitchell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.) (No. 90-15952), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
303 (1992) [hereinafter Appellees' Responding Brief).
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the debtors and held that the value of the contract
was not to be included in the total value of the car under any standard, because the
service contract did not contain language granting GMAC a security interest. Mitchell,
954 F.2d at 561.
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terest in the vehicle, all parts and accessories thereon, all insurance premiums financed by the seller, and all service contract
premiums financed by the seller.ll
On March 4, 1988, the Mitchells filed for protection under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. 12 Their reorganization plan,
confirmed by the bankruptcy court on May 11, 1988, offered to
pay one hundred percent of the value of their creditors' allowed
secured claims, and ten percent of their creditors' allowed unsecured claims. 13
GMAC filed a claim as a secured creditor of the Cadillac
and asserted that its allowed claim in the value of the EI Dorado
should be $27,062.25. 14 The Mitchells objected and the bankruptcy court held a hearing to determine the value. HI In the ensuing battle of appraisers, two distinct positions emerged. The
debtors' expert testified that the Cadillac had a value of
$20,761.00 on March 4, 1988, the date they filed their petition,
while GMAC's appraiser, using the same market guide as the
Mitchells' expert, testified that the vehicle had a value on that
day of $24,185.00. 16 The $3,424.00 difference resulted from the
11. Supra note 10.
12. Id. at 559. Chapter 13 contains the provisions for reorganization of the debts of
individuals with less than $100,000.00 in noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts and
less than $350,000.00 in noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)
(1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988). Chapter 13 is used by individual wage earners
with regular income and small sole proprietors for whom Chapter 11 reorganization is too
cumbersome. In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 1991); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Congo 1st Sess. 310 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6277.
The Bankruptcy Code also contains provisions for liquidation of an individual's
debts and equity in non-exempt assets under Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
Reorganizations are provided for municipalities under Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1988). Business entities can file for protection against creditors while liquidating their assets under Chapter 7 or reorganizing their debt burden
under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1174 (1988). Family farmers with regular annual income qualify as debtors
under Chapter 12. 11 U.S.C. § 109(0, (g) (1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1988).
13. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Both appraisers used the Kelley Blue Book valuation guide to arrive at their
respective figures. This type of evidence of value is used routinely in bankruptcy courts
to establish a vehicle's value, at times in conjuction with expert testimony and also
standing alone. See Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559; Memphis Bank & Trust CO. V. Walker, 14
B.R. 264, 265 (D.C. W.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1980); see also S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1983) ("The Committee ...
encourages reference to trade publications as appropriate indicia of the market value of
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debtors' appraiser's reliance on the wholesale value, while the
creditor's appraiser relied on the retail value contained in the
valuation guide for the year and make Cadillac in question. 17
The bankruptcy court found that GMAC's position should
prevail and the Mitchells appealed. 18 The Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel reversed in favor of the debtors, and GMAC in turn filed
an appeal with the Ninth Circuit. 19

III. BACKGROUND
A. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a)
1.

AND

1325

11 U.S.C. § 506(a)

An understanding of the well-settled precepts of valuation
under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) is a prerequisite to understanding the
various valuation standards used in bankruptcy proceedings. IlO
For instance, the value of an item used to secure an indebtedness can change throughout a single bankruptcy proceeding, and
no determination of value is binding upon a debtor or creditor if
it becomes necessary to make a subsequent determination of the
value of the same piece of property at a later time. 1l1
The first sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) provides that:
[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien
on property in which the estate has an interest, or
that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this
title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest
in such property, or to the extent of the amount
the property 'in question." (cited in 3 COLLIER, ~ 506.03, at 506·13 to 506·14».
17. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559.
18.Id.
19. Id.; Mitchell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., (In re Mitchell), BAP No.
NC·89·1222·JVAs, Amended Memorandum, (9th Cir. BAP June 15, 1990).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
21. S. REPT. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5854; 3 COLLIER ~ 506.04 at 506·25, n.22; see also David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors
and the Eely Nature of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 66·70 (1991)
[hereinafter Carlson, Secured Creditors]; James F. Queenan, Standards for Valuation of
Security Interests in Chapter II, 92 COM. L.J. 18, 25·28 (1987) [hereinafter Queenan,
Standards for Valuation]; Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in
Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1062·63 (1985) [hereinafter Fortgang & Mayer, Val·
uation in Bankruptcy].
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subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of
such creditor's interest or the amount so subject
to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed
claim.li
This first sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) thus divides a secured debt into two claims, one secured and the other unsecured. 2s Each bifurcated claim is treated throughout the pendency of the bankruptcy case as "separate and independent"
components of the original indebtedness. 2•
The division of a claim into secured and unsecured portions
under '11 U.S.C. § 506 is valid "only for the purpose for which
the determination is made."2& Thus, the standard of valuation
can change depending on the purpose of the valuation. 26 For example, value of property that is exempt from being used to satisfy creditors' claims is defined as the "fair market value as of
the date of the filing of the petition."27 Similarly, when a Chapter 7 debtor tries to redeem collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 722, the
value of the item is the price the debtor would pay to replace
the item: its present fair market value (or the amount of the
claim if the claim is less than fair market value).28
22. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
23. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6085:
To the extent of the value of the security interest, [the secured creditor] is treated as having a secured claim, entitled to
be paid in full under the plan, unless, of course, he accepts less
than full payment. To the extent that his claim against the
debtor exceeds the value of his collateral, he is treated as having an unsecured claim, and he will receive payment along
with all other general unsecured creditors.
See 3 COLLIER ~ 506.04, at 506-15 to 506-16; Jeffrey K. Robison, The Debtor's Right to
Restrict Lienholder Recovery to the Value of the Encumbered Property Under Section
506 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 J. CORP. L. 433, 435 (1986); supra note 2.
24. 3 COLLIER, ~ 506.04 at 506-15; see also In re Lopez-Soto, 764 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.
1985); Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981).
25. 124 CONGo REC. S17411 (daily ed. October 6, 1978).
26. 124 CONGo REC. Hll095 (daily ed. September 28, 1978) ("A valuation early in the
case in a proceeding under sections 361-363 would not be binding upon the debtor or
creditor at the time of confirmation of the plan.").
27. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (1988); In re Walsh, 5 B.R. 239, 240 (1981).
28. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 722 (1988); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5881; see also In re Mcquinn, 6 B.R. 899, 900 (Bankr. D.
Nb. 1980) ("[T]he retail value of the collateral includes costs'such as dealer overhead,
salesperson's commissions, and profit which the debtor should not be required to
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By contrast, where a secured creditor requests relief from
stay under 11 u.s.C. § 362, the wholesale value of an item given
as security is used to determine whether the creditor's interest is
adequately protected; relief is granted if the wholesale value of
the collateral is less than the amount owed to the creditor.29
The second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) describes how
valuation is to be done: Congress mandated that goods given to
secure payment or performance are to be valued "in light of the
purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of
the property involved." [emphasis added)S° The phrasing of the
second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) has led courts to use inconsistent valuation standards in determining the allowed
amounts of secured claims on vehicles in Chapter 13 plans. 31
The valuation standards courts have used include retail value,32
"open market value,"33 the amount realized by the creditor upon
foreclosure and sale,34 the wholesale/average trade-in value,3C1
and liquidation value. 36
Counsel for debtors and creditors have contributed to the
confusion as to what standard of valuation properly implements
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) by their partisan arguments emphasizing eipay .... ").
29. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988); see also In re Lackow, 16 B.R. 566, 570 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1981), aff'd, 22 B.R. 1018 (D. Fla. 1982).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); In re Lopez-Soto, 764 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1985);
Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981); see also 3 COLLIER, ~
506.04 at 506-15; John B. Butler, III, Valuation of Secured Claims Under 11 U.S.C.
506(a) , 89 COM. L.J. 342, 343-44 nn.17-20 (1984).
31. In re Smith, 42 B.R. 198, 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870,
875 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (wholesale value); In re Reynolds, 17 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1981) (retail replacement cost).
32. Reynolds, 17 B.R. at 493.
33. In re Beranek, 9 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); In re Miller 4 B.R. 392,
394 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) ("[TJhe median value between retail and wholesale values
would most accurately approximate that open maket value .... ").
34. In re Stumbo, 7 B.R. 939 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
35. In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 875 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) ("[WJhere the collateral is a
car and the secured claimant does not present evidence on its usual commercially reasonable method of selling cars, courts have presumed that the value of the car is the wholesale value shown by industry used car guides."); see also In re Van Nort, 9 B.R. 218, 221
(Bankr. E.D. Mi. 1981); In re Jones, 5 B.R. 736, 738 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). Compare Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v.
Walker, 14 B.R. 264, 265 (D.C.W.D. Tenn. 1981).
36. In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc., 18 B.R. 29, 32-33 (Bankr. D. Me.
1982).
0
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ther the first or second phrase of its second sentence. 37 As a result, counsel's partisan and adversarial approach to bankruptcy
litigation has sometimes led bankruptcy courts to analyze 11
U.S.C. § 506(a) as if it contained the disjunctive "or" rather
than the conjunction "and."38
Counsel for creditors emphasize the use of a high valuation
standard (such as retail value), and tend to support this position
by guiding the courts to the second phrase of the second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Le. "in light of ... the proposed
dispostion and use").39 By implication, a creditor's standard for
valuing vehicles in Chapter 13 cases would be based primarily
upon whether or not the debtor proposed to retain and use the
vehicle.
Debtors' attorneys, on the other hand, focus almost exclusively on the first phrase of the second sentence of 11 U.S.C. §
506(a) (Le. "in light of the purpose of the valuation"), and use it
to promote the use of a lower standard, for example, the collateral's wholesale value. 40 This approach implies that the control37. In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 248-51 (4th Cir. 1991); see also In re Claeys, 81 B.R.
985, 990-91 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987):
[AJ valuation is made ... it seems, upon the emphasis given to
the first and second sentences of section 506(a). The first sentence, providing that the claim is secured to the extent of the
value of the creditor's interest in the property, suggests that
since it is the creditor's interest that is being valued and not
the collateral itself, it should not make any difference whether
the debtor is retaining the property. Yet, the language of the
second sentence suggests that the proposed disposition or use
of the collateral itself must be considered when determining
that value.
Counsel for the Mitchells and for GMAC aligned themselves according to this
debtor-creditor dichotomy. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-17, Mitchell (No. 90-15952);
Appellees' Responding Brief at 20-22, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). The greatest strength in
the Ninth Circuit's approach to the valuation issue lies in the court's ability to find a
balance between the two positions.
38. Infra note 113 and accompanying text.
39. See In re 222 Liberty Assocs. 105 B.R. 798, 803 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re
Courtright, 57 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986); see also In re Usry, 106 B.R. 759, 761
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989).
40. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560; In re Smith, 92 B.R. 198, 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984)
("[IJt is the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in property which must be valued."); In re Boring, 91 B.R. 791, 794 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("Most courts recognize
that the debtor's proposed retention and use of collateral does not emasculate the fact
that it is in the first instance the creditor's interest in the collateral that must be
valued.").
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ling event in the valuation process is the purpose of the valuation. However, both phrases from 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) must be
used in the valuation process along with 11 U.S.C. § 1325.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1325

This section sets forth the requirements that must be satisfied for a debtor's Chapter 13 reorganization plan to be confirmed. 41 Toward this goal, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) provides that:
(a) except as provided in subsection (b), the court
shall confirm a plan if (5) with respect to each allowed secured claim
provided by the plan (A) the holder of such claim has accepted the
plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such
claim retain the lien securing the claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim . . . .42

Thus, 11 U.S.C. § 1325 uses the amount of the secured creditor's claim to establish the minimum amount to be paid to the
creditor through the Chapter 13 reorganization plan. 4s The
amount of the secured claim is to be determined under 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a)," which defines in its first sentence the value of a creditor's allowed secured claim as "the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the property."411
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5928; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385 .
. 42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A), (a)(5)(B)(i), (a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988).
43. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559; 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988); supra note 42.
44. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 638S.
4S. 11 U.S.C. § S06(a) (1988); In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984):
The purpose of the collateral valuation under Section
132S(a)(5)(B)(ii) is not to assume that secured claimants will
receive under the plan as much money as debtors would have
to spend to replace the collateral. Instead, the purpose of collateral valuation under Section 132S(a)(S)(B)(ii) is to protect
secured claimants from loss by assuring that they will receive
under the plan as much money, or its equivalent, as they
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The interplay of 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and 1325(a)(5) requires
a court to place a value on property of the bankruptcy estate
before a plan of rehabilitation is confirmed.·8 Creditors must
show that the estate has an interest in the property used by the
debtor as collateral.·7 Then the nature (i.e. fee, leasehold, joint
tenancy) of the estate's interest in the property must be disclosed.'s Finally, the court must determine the standard of valuation to accurately calculate the value of the creditor's allowed
secured claim,, 9
:
Participants in a Chapter 13 proceeding must use both
phrases of the second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) to determine what standard of valuation is to be used in placing a value
on property used as collateral. Thus the purpose of the valuation
is established under 11 U.S.C. § 1325 and then the proposed disposition and use of the property securing the debtor's obligation
to the creditor is considered.IIO
.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)

The Bankruptcy Code ll1 does not define the term "value."112
Likewise, it contains no specific directive on what standards of
valuation to use in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. However, courts must define both value and valuation 'standards on a
case-by -case basis. liS
One approach to defining these key elements of a bankruptcy proceeding has been to use 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) in conjuncwould receive if they were permitted to sell the collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner.
See also In re Malody, 102 B.R. 745, 750 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) and infra notes 70-91
and accompanying text discussing Malody.
46. Supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47. 3 COLLIER, 11 506.04 at 506-17 to 506-18.
48.Id.
49.Id.
50. In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).
51. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353 (1984).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 101(1}-(61) (1988).
53. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5854; RR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6312.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 7

18

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:9

tion with other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. 1I4 This interplay between chapters of the Bankruptcy Code is done
frequently in order to achieve consistent application in analogous situations. 1I1I
Reliance on legislative history is the second method used to
define value under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).116 The report of the House
Committee on the Judiciary regarding proposed amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 contains the definitive source of
congressional intent regarding the meaning and use of 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a).117 The House report stated that:
'[v]alue' does not necessarily contemplate forced
sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor does
it always imply a full going concern value. Courts
will have to determine value on a case-by-case ba54. For example, Chapter 13 cases often refer to Chapter 12 cases in valuation issues. See In re Malody, 102 B.R. 745,748-49 (9th Cir. BAP 1989)(citing In re Courtright,
57 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986»; see also United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 108 S. Ct. 626, 630 (1988) (drawing an analogy between
the use of the phrase "interest in property" in 11 U.S.C. § 362 and its use in 11 U.S.C. §
506(a».
The Bankruptcy Code facilitates and encourages such comparisons and analogies.
For instance, the wording of 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(i),(ii) and 11 U.S.C. §1
325(a)(5)(B)(i), (ii) are identical, thus making comparisons between the results in
one section applicable to similar situations under the other; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
The limits to using results under one chapter of the Code within the context of a
case arising under another chapter are contained in sections 102 and 103. 11 U.S.C. §§
102(8), 103(a)-(i) (1988).
55. In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, _ U.s. _,
(1992); 1992 WL 303365 (Dec. 7, 1992). Nobleman represents the possible outer limits of
Mitchell's analytical approach. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nobleman in
order to settle a conflict between circuits on the issue of whether homeowners may use 11
U.S.C. § 506(a) and Chapter 13 to bifurcate mortgages on principal residences. Permitting this approach would allow debtors to satisfy debts on their home mortgages at less
than bargained for prices.
However, tension exists in this situation between 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and 1322(b)(2).
The latter section precludes debtors from modifying the terms of mortgages on principal
residences. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1322(b)(2) (1988); Nobleman, 968 F.2d 485-89; see also
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 775 (1992); In re Houghland, 886 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th
Cir. 1989).
If the Court ultimately holds in Nobleman that the interplay between 11 U.S.C. §§
506(a) and 1322(b)(2) is controlled by the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), the Mitchell
approach will in effect have been extended to the home mortgage arena.
56. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559; Appellant's Opening Brief at 23-25, Mitchell (No. 90- .'
15952); Appellees' Responding Brief at 6-16, Mitchell (No. 90-15952).
57. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.N.
6312.
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sis, taking into account the facts of each case and
the competing interests in the case . . . :i8

The Senate Committee Report on the companion bill further explained the use and approach to value under 11 U.S.C. §
506(a).1i9The Senate Committee stated that:
[w]hile courts will have to determine value on a
case-by-case basis, the subsection makes it clear
that valuation is to be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the subject property. This determination shall be made in conjunction with any
hearing on such disposition or use of property or
on a plan affecting the creditor's interest. 8o

In 1981, the Senate reviewed the Bankruptcy Code for further refinements and adjustments. The Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report81 which described the reasons for the various proposals for changes in the Code. The Committee proposed
to amend 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and establish a preference for the
use of a resale market standard "with the choice of wholsale
[sic] or retail measurements of value to be determined by reference to the condition of the property and the debtor's proposed
use or disposition thereof."82 Thus the first sentence of 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a) would be deleted and replaced with a "reference" to the
condition of the property, and the creditor's half of the second
sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) would be retained and dominate
the valuation analysis.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary proposed these
changes because, in the Committee's view:
[C]ourts have, in too many cases, undervalued
collateral property to an extent which denies adequate protection to secured creditors. Problems of
proof which creditors face are compounded by ju58.Id.
59. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 UoSoCoCoA.No
58540
600Ido
61. S. REP. Noo 65, 98th Congo, 1st Sess., 5-6 (1983) (cited in 3 COLLIER, 11 506003 at
506-13 to 506-14)0
62.Ido
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dicial confusion over what standard should be
employed - wholesale or retail, resale or straight
line depreciation. Many courts have fixated upon
wholesale resale at [sic] the appropriate standard,
even for property with a high resale value in the
retail market. Whereas the Bankruptcy Reform
Act sought to encourage valuation on a case-bycase basis in focusing on the proposed use of the
property in question as a determinant factor, the
original intent of the Congress in this regard has
not uniformly been carried into practice by the
courts.6S

However, when Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code, it
included only a few of the amendments suggested by the Senate
Judiciary Committee.6• The rejected proposals included the
changes to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).611
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
Counsel of record for both sides in the Mitchell 66 dispute
aligned themselves according to the debtor-creditor dichotomy
and obtained different results when they applied 11 U.S.C. §
506(a) to their renditions of the facts. 67 Thus, when the bankruptcy court entered its order for relief, GMAC's lien totalled
$27,062.25. The debtors' valuation under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) left
GMAC with a secured claim of $20,761.00 (the wholesale value
of the Cadillac) and an unsecured claim of $6,301.25. 68 This lat63.Id.
64. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98·353 (1984).
65. 3 COLLIER, 11 506.02 at 505-12. Using failed proposals for legislation to divine
legislative intent carries some risk because there is no record regarding why the legislators voted against the legislation. However, when GMAC appeared before the Ninth Circuit in the Mitchell case, its argument emphasized the proposed use or disposition of the
collateral. This is the same reasoning that appeared in the Senate Committee's report in
favor of amending 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). GMAC thus put itself into the position of appearing to ask the court to legislate where Congress had refused to do so, and lessened the
Mitchells' burden of proving legislative intent from failed legislation. See Appellant's
Opening Brief at 9-26, Mitc,.,ell (No. 90-15952); Appellees' Responding Brief at 14-16,
Mitchell (No. 90-15952).
66. In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992).
67. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, 13, Mitchell (No. 90-15952); Appellees' Responding Brief at 16-19, Mitchell (No. 90-15952).
68. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559.
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ter claim under the Mitchells' proposed plan would only be paid
at only ten percent of its value, a total of about $630.00. Accordingly, GMAC would receive $21,391.00, plus interest, usi~g the
Mitchells' valuation.
In contrast, GMAC asserted that under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) it
had a secured claim of $24,185.00 (the retail value of the vehicle), leaving only $2,877.25 unsecured to be paid at ten percent
of its value, or approximately $287.73. 69 Therefore, GMAC
would receive $24,472.73, plus interest, under its valuation, a
difference of $3,081.00 before interest.

A.

MAJORITY

The Mitchell decision relied heavily on the analysis and
holding of In re Malady,70 and affirmed Malady's analytical approach. The Ninth Circuit specifically noted in Mitchell that
Malady stood as the leading Ninth Circuit case on valuation
standards, and approved its holding. 71 Thus, a clear understanding of Malady is necessary to understand Mitchell fully.
In Malady, the debtors bargained with a single creditor,
Valley National Bank (VNB), in two separate transactions for
the purchase of two vehicles.72 Under the terms of the first
purchase, the Bank loaned the Malodys $9,739.19 and retained a
perfected security interest in a 1985 Ford Tempo.73 The
Malodys received the car and agreed to make monthly installment payments on the principal, plus interest.
The second transaction occurred six months later. VNB
agreed to loan the Malodys $18,383.34 toward the purchase of a
1986 Ford Bronco II in exchange for a perfected security interest
in the vehicle. H
Eighteen months later, the Malodys filed for protection
69. [d.

70. 102 B.R. 745 (9th Cir. BAP 1989).
71. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560.
72. Malady. 102 B.R. at 746.
73. [d.
74. [d.
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under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. 711 As of the date of
their request for an order for relief, the Malodys owed VNB
$6,457.75 for the Tempo, and $15,902.10 for the Bronco and valued both vehicles at their wholesale values. 78 They filed their
plan concurrently with their voluntary petition, giving them
thirty days from the date of their request for an order for relief
to begin making payments to creditors in comformance with
their plan for reorganization. 77
The Malodys argued that the collateral should be valued at
the amount a creditor would receive upon repossessing and selling the vehicles. 78 VNB argued that because the debtors retained
possession of the vehicles, the value of the creditor's claim is the
replacement cost to the debtors or, alternatively, the going concern value because "their retention adds to the estate by assisting in the effectuation of the debtors' Plan."79
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Malody rejected the
creditor's position on four grounds. First, valuation for the purpose of confirming a Chapter 13 plan under 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(5)(b)(ii) is to "protect a secured claimant from loss by
assuring that it will receive as much money under the plan as it
would receive if it were permitted to sell the vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner," and because the debtors' replacement cost is not an accurate reflection of this amount. 80
Second, because the vehicles in Malody were not essential
to the successful completion of the debtors' plan, replacement
value would not be the appropriate measure of value. 81 An example of collateral that can be essential to an effective reorganization is farm land that produces crops from which the debtors
can generate income which in turn is used to service their debt. 82
75. Id.; supra note 12.
76. Malady, 102 B.R. at 746.
77. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(l) (1988).
78. Malady, 102 B.R. at 747.
79.Id.
80. Id. at 749 (citing In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984»; see In re
Petry, 76 B.R. 651, 653 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987); Memphis Bank & Trust Co., 14 B.R. 264,
265 (D.C.W.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657,660 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re
Van Nort, 9 B.R. 218, 220-21 (Bankr. E.D. Mi. 1981).
81. Malady, 102 B.R. at 749.
82. In re Courtright, 57 B.R. 495, 497-98 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986).
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However, crops are dissimilar to the type of collateral in the
Mitchell case. Collateral which is closer to that found in Malady
and Mitchell is the situation where a debtor. grants a security
interest in farm machinery that is used for the production of a
debtor's income after bankruptcy.s3
In both of these examples the property voluntarily encumbered by the debtor is part of an ongoing business and more
than just incidental to the production of income by the debtors.
Under these circumstances, according to Malady and Mitchell,
the replacement/retail value of the collateral is the proper standard of valuation of the secured creditor's claim. However, the
vehicles involved in Malady and Mitchell did not produce income; thus both courts applied the wholesale value of the vehicles as the standard to determine the creditors' allowed claims.
The Malady court's third reason for holding replacement
value as an inappropriate standard focused on the fact that the
risk that creditors take in extending credit is ignored: if a debtor
defaults the creditor must repossess the collateral and sell it at a
value less than retail value. s4
Finally, Malady noted that in the context of confirmation of
Chapter 13 plans, valuation balances the pressure on the debtor
to pay the secured creditor under threat of repossession by ensuring that the creditor receives only what it could receive upon
repossession and resale. slI Citing the 1977 House Report of the
Committee on the Judiciary, Malady noted that:
[t]he [secured] creditor obtains a security interest
in all of the debtor's furniture, clothes, cooking
utensils, and other personal effects. These items
have little or no resale value. They do, however
have a high replacement cost. The mere threat of
repossession operates as pressure on the debtor to

83. In re Sprecher, 65 B.R. 598, 599-601 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986).
84. Malady, 102 B.R. at 750.
85.Id.
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pay the secured creditor more than he would receive were he actually to repossess and sell the
goods. 86

If retail/replacement value were used as the standard of valuation of a vehicle, this balance between the true value of collateral and its value as leverage for the creditor would be unbalanced to the point that debtors would be unable to obtain the
fresh financial start that bankruptcy tries to offer. 87·

The Mitchell majority approved of this analysis, but added
no additional comment or critique. 88 Instead, Mitchell, like
Malody, started its analysis of valuation standards by focusing
on two phrases of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a): an allowed claim of a secured creditor "is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property,"89 and that "such value shall be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use
of such property."90 Both Malody and Mitchell then examine
these phrases in the inverse order in which they appear in the
statute. Starting with the latter, both courts focused on the legislative history behind these contradicting statements. 91
The Ninth Circuit noted that the purpose of the valuation
needed to be examined and it established this purpose as the
need to confirm a Chapter 13 plan. 92 The court then noted that
fulfilling this purpose required compliance with 11 U.S.C. §
86. [d.; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1977); Appellees' Responding
Brief at 12, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). In its Opening Brief, GMAC severly criticized the
use of this passage by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Malody. Appellant's Opening
Brief at 23-26, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). GMAC argued that because the quoted text refers only to household goods and not vehicles, it does not apply to the latter items. [d.
The Mitchells' counter argument, however, contained a cogent point: there is nothing in the House report to indicate that the method of valuing secured claims is dependent on the type of collateral or that Congress intended to distinguish between household goods and cars. Appellees' Responding Brief at 12, Mitchell (No. 90-15952).
Presumably, if Congress intended such a distinction, it would have made it.
87. Malody, 102 B.R. at 749-50.
88. The Mitchell decision is so bereft of independent reasoning that GMAC focused
its criticism on the analysis contained in Malody. Appellant's Opening Brief at 17 n.18,
Mitchell (No. 90-15952).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 506(8) (1988); Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559.
91. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559-60; Malody, 102 B.R. at 748.
92. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559-60.
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1325. 93

The Ninth Circuit then turned to the first sentence of 11
U.S.C. § 506(a) and analyzed the purpose of the valuation in order to establish the relative interests at stake. 9• Finding that the
purpose of the valuation is satisfied if the creditor's interest in
the collateral is protected, the Court posed the question of what
. is included in the creditor's interest. 9& In the case of a debtor
who proposes to retain a vehicle under a Chapter 13 plan of reorganization, the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the
vehicle is· the amount that the creditor would receive in a commercially reasonable sale of the vehicle. 96 Evidence having been
heard in the Mitchell lower court proceedings that a commercially reasonable sale in the automobile context is an auction attended only by automobile dealers,97 and that the price normally
received at such an auction is the wholesale price,9s the Ninth
Circuit held that the valuation standard to be applied under the
facts of Mitchell is the wholesale price. 9s
At first glance, this result appears to vindicate· the Mitchell's position completely. However, the Ninth Circuit's decision
can be divided into two parts: that which debtors will support
and that which creditors will approve.
The pro~debtor nature of the Mitchell decision is found in
the Ninth Circuit's support for the view expressed by a majority
of lower courts which rejects an "across-the-board" application
of a retail standard in every case where a creditor's interest in a
vehicle needs to be evaluated. loo The Ninth Circuit thus ap93.Id.
94.Id.
95.Id.
96.Id.
97. Appellees' Responding Brief at 26, Mitchell (No. 90-15952).
98. Id.; see also In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981):
At the valuation hearing ... an employee of GMAC testified
as to GMAC's procedure for disposing of abandoned and repossessed cars. [The employee] stated that [repossessed] cars
are sold on a "bid" market. Although [the employee] did not
elaborate on this method of sale, it is evident that this procedure clearly contemplates a wholesale market value as opposed to a retail or forced-sale (liquidation) market value.
99. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560.
100. Id.; Queenan, Standards for Valuation, supra note 21, at 30.
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proved a line of decisions which define value from the perspective of what collateral is worth in the hands of creditors after
foreclosure and a commercially reasonable sale.101 By implication, the court disapproved decisions which establish value of
collateral by looking to the debtor's cost of replacing property in
which they have granted an interest to a creditor and which the
debtor proposes to retain in a Chapter 13 financial
reorganization. lo2
Mitchell is a "pro-debtor" decision in most of the bankruptcy cases to which it may be applied. The court assigned the
wholesale value to the Cadillac, the lowest value asserted as applicable. The vast majority of Chapter 13 reorganizations are
used by individuals to reorganize consumer debt. loa Their vehicles are not part of a going business concern and do not contribute to a successful reorganization, thus most Chapter 13 debtors
will pay only wholesale value of a vehicle through their plan in
reliance on Mitchell.

However, Mitchell becomes a "pro-creditor" decision in
those instances where a creditor can show that a Chapter 13
debtor's vehicle is used for more than mere transportation, and
is in fact used as part of a going concern. 104 If the vehicle. contributes to a debtor's livelihood, and the debtor proposes to retain the vehicle, the cost to the debtor of replacing the vehicle
will be its value. As a result, the allowed claim of the secured
creditor will increase, and the debtor's fresh start after bankruptcy will be predicated on satisfying a much larger obligation.
At the same time, however, the Ninth Circuit's caveat regarding vehicles used in a going concern suggests that the application of the wholesale value is to be applied only under particular facts. lOll In the Mitchell court's view, vehicles used by a
debtor in a manner that is particularly beneficial to the debtor
or that is particularly detrimental to the vehicle's value requires
101. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560.
. 102. [d.; see also Queenan, Standards for Valuation, supra note 21, at 30.
103. 3 COLLIER, '\I 506.04 at 506·26 n.25; Bankruptcy Filings Increase 22 Percent, 22
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) Weekly News & Comment No. 15, at A7 to All (January 16,
1992).
104. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560.
105. Id.
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the use of the replacement or "retail" standard of valuation. lOS
Thus the definition of a going concern which can be extrapolated from Mitchell is an' activity that assists the debtor in his
financial recovery by producing income or an activity that
threatens the value of the collateral. lo7
B.

DISSENT

The Mitchell dissent agreed with the conclusion reached by
the bankruptcy court. Judge Noonan noted that "[t]he key fact
is that the debtor is going to use the car."I08 Accordingly, because the debtors' proposed disposition of the vehicle is to retain
it for their use, and the debtors cannot sell the vehicle at wholesale, the cost of the debtors replacing the car is its value. This
figure corresponds to the highest figure in the automobile valuation guide. loe
The dissent thus emphasizes not just the fact that the debtors are retaining the subject vehicle, but that it is to be retained
106. Id.
107. Id. Other commentators and jurists have developed alternative definitions of
"going concern." See In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 875 n.ll (Bankr. D. Utah 1984):
Property is sometimes said to have a going concern value. This
expression has at least two meanings. First, going concern
value may refer to property which can be sold for a higher
price as inventory of an ongoing business than if sold by a
closed or closing business .... Second, going concern value
may mean that the debtor can use the property to generate
income greater than the price for which the property could be
sold. An example of this meaning could be tools used by a
mechanic to produce income greater than the price which
could be obtained at a sale in the used tool market .... Using
this meaning when valuing a consumer's car, however, is artificial. It is not the use of the car that generates income for a
Chapter 13 debtor who uses the car to drive to and from work.
It is the services of the debtor unrelated to the use of the car
that generate income. Thus to say that a car used to drive to
and from work has a going concern value makes little sense.
See also Carlson, Secured Creditors, supra note 21, at 87-91 (discussing problems of
allocating value to individual pieces of equipment used in a going concern).
Possibly the most straightforward definition of "going concern" is "a business with
some sort of future." See Fortgang and Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, supra note 21,
at 1063-66 (citing FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS §
B05.103 (1984) and G. NEWTON, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACCOUNTING: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURES 500-01 (2d ed. 1981».
108. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 561.
109. Id.; supra note 16.
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and used by the debtors, making their successful reorganization
more likely by assisting in the production of income that will be
used to fund the debtors' Chapter 13 plan.
IV. CRITIQUE
Mitchell's contribution to bankruptcy law rests in two areas. First, the Ninth Circuit avoided the partisan positions that
influenced some lower courts. The court adhered to the plain
language of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and concentrated on the conjunctive word "and" rather than altering it to the disjunctive word
"or." The court also used 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) in tandem with 11
U.S.C. § 1325 to find the purpose of the valuation (i.e. plan confirmation), and carefully noted that the interest to be valued was
the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the collateral.
The Ninth Circuit in Mitchell thus provided the lower courts
and bankruptcy practitioners with an invaluable lesson in statutory interpretation.

Second, the court's acknowledgment that collateral used in
a going concern should be valued by a standard other than
wholesale value stands as a guide to the use of legislative history. By emphasizing that different fact patterns can lead to different results, the Ninth Circuit in Mitchell followed Congress's
instruction to conduct valuation of collateral in bankruptcy on a
case-by-case basis.
The Ninth Circuit in Mitchell sought to reconcile the various approaches to valuation by holding that the creditor's interest in the collateral is what is being valued, and wholesale value
best approximates the dollar amount of this interest. llo However, the court also held that replacement cost to the debtor (i.e.
retail value) controls valuation of vehicles where the contemplated use by the debtor of the vehicle is as part of a going
concern.llI
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Mitchell affirmed the approach taken by a majority of lower courts from both the Ninth
and other circuits. It also affirmed the legislature's intent that
110. In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992).
111. Id.
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valuation in the Chapter 13 context acts partly to balance the
inequities between debtors and creditors by relieving the threat
that repossession poses to debtors. The court also avoided making a partisan decision by affirming that circumstances exist that
warrant using replacement cost to the debtor as the value of a
secured creditor's claim. 112

Mitchell successfully avoided the error made by some courts
which have read 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) in the disjunctive. Instead,
Mitchell, following Malody, correctly interpreted it as containing two requirements joined in the conjunCtive. 1l3 Completely
rejected by the Ninth Circuit is an "across-the-board" application of the retail price to value security interests in automobiles
in Chapter 13 proceedings. 114 The court held this approach to be
unsupported by case law, the Bankruptcy Code, and commentators. IUI Thus Mitchell endorses a balanced approach to establishing valuation standards under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), an affirmation from a circuit court that had been missing from the
reported bankruptcy decisions involving family owned vehicles
prior to Mitchell.
In fact, the same balanced approach to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
that is found in the Mitchell decision appeared under a slightly
different context in a Fourth Circuit decision, In re Balbus. ll8
Balbus used both prongs of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and its legislative
history to decide the value of the collateral. ll7 The Balbus court
looked first to the purpose of the valuation at issue, and then
decided on the valuation standard to be applied. 118
In Balbus, the debtor had given an interest in real property
as security for a debt. The holder of the debt asserted that the
fair market value of Balbus's real property should not include
hypothetical costs of sale that the creditor would incur if it re112. Id.
113. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560-51; Malody, 102 B.R. at 748-49; see also In re Balbus,

933 F.2d 246, 248-51 (4th Cir. 1991); infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text discussing Balbus.
114. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560.
115. Id.
116. 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991).
117. Id. at 249.
118. Id. at 252.
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possessed the house.l19 If the creditor succeeded in excluding
these costs, the debtor would have had to amend his bankruptcy
petition and shift debt from his secured schedule to the unsecured debt schedule. 120 If this occurred, the Balbus debtor
would exceed the limit of $100,000.00 of non contingent, liquidated debt imposed on Chapter 13 petitioners by 11 U.S.C. §
109(e).121 Thus the debtor would have been foreced out of bankruptcy and exposed to his creditor's enforcement and collection
actions, or forced to convert his Chapter 13 proceeding to one
under Chapter 7. 122
The Balbus court'looked first to the purpose of the valuation: to determine if unsecured debts are less than the limit imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). The court reasoned that deducting
hypothetical sales costs would make this bright line limit less
useful. 123 Thus the purpose of the valuation is served by certainty, not hypothesis, so the exclusion of these costs is not permitted under this prong of the 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) valuation
procedure. 124
The Balbus court then looked to the proposed disposition or
use of the collateral. Although this sentence is phrased in the
permissive disjunctive form, Balbus blurred the line between
disposition and use by speaking of the debtor's possession and
119. Id. at 247-48. Cases prior to Balbus considering the issue of whether hypthetical costs of sale should be deducted from a the fair market value of a debtor's property
divided their opinions along the debtor-creditor dichotomy. Supra note 37. Those cases
which held that hypothetical costs of sale should be deducted from a debtor's fair market
value when the debtor proposes to retain the collateral emphasized the first sentence of
11 U.S.C. § 506(a). See In re Smith, 92 B.R. 287, 290 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("Because
it is the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in property which must be valued, it is
appropriate to deduct costs of sale regardless of whether a debtor intends to retain and
use the property."); In re Boring, 91 B.R. 791, 794 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("Most
courts recognize that the debtor's proposed retention and use of collateral does not
emasculate the fact that it is in the first instance the creditor's interest in the collateral
that must be valued.").
On the other hand, some courts prior to Balbus emphasized only the second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and held that hypothetical sale costs should not be deducted.
See In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 105 B.R. 798, 803 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Courtright,
57 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986); see also In re Usry, 106 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1989).
120. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 247-48.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
122. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 248.
123. Id. at 251.
124. Id. at 251-52.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/7

22

Clark: Bankruptcy Law

BANKRUPTCY LAW

1993]

31

use of the house put up as collateral as identical concepts. However, the court did focus on disposition by noting that the debtor
had no intention of selling the house. By implication, because
there is no sale, no sale price is needed, and because no sale
price is needed, no costs· of sale need be figured or deducted
from the fair market value for the purpose of this valuation.l~1I
The debtor's scheduling of his debts in his bankruptcy petition remained as scheduled by Balbus, no amendment was required, and his case proceeded under Chapter 13. 126
The strength of the Mitchell, Malady, and Balbus decisions
lies in their reliance on careful statutory interpretation. Such reliance gave a high degree of certainty to their holdings. The
same degree of certainty is missing from the Mitchell majority's
analysis of a vehicle's role in. a going concern. As a result, the
Ninth Circuit created a vague exception to a bright line general
rule.
The Ninth Circuit gave slight indication of the extent to
which a vehi<::le must be linked to the production of income in
order to be a part of a going concern. The court noted that even
though Mr. Mitchell drove to his customers' businesses in the
Cadillac in order to conduct his commercial glass contracting
business, such use did not produce income. 127 Instead, according
to the Ninth Circuit, the car's use was incidental to his ability to
conduct his business.l2S However, the precise reason why Mitchell's use of this particular vehicle did not constitute a going concern is not articulated clearly in Mitchell. 129
On the other hand, Judge Noonan's dissent implies that because the Mitchells used their Cadillac for more than just pleasure or commuting to and from work, the car produced income. lso
However, Judge Noonan also downplayed the use of the vehicle
in the Mitchell's business and instead argued that valuation is
only to be based on the "key fact" that the debtors proposed to
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

[d.
[d. at 248, 252.
Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559.
[d.
[d. at 560.
[d. at 561.
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retain the car.13l Thus the weakness in the approach to valuation in the Mitchell dissent is that it de-emphasizes the purpose
of the valuation by stressing the proposed use or disposition of
the collateral. 132
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Mitchell conducted
a complete analysis of the extent ,that the Mitchells used their
vehicle to create income through their business venture. While
the need to examine this situation raises one more issue to be
litigated in the course of a bankrupcty proceeding, just such an
examination appears to be required under the legislative history
of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).133
V. CONCLUSION
The Mitchell decision supports a view expressed by many
bankruptcy courts. The Ninth Circuit's decision promotes the
philosophy underlying bankruptcy law that debtors are to receive a fresh start and creditors are to receive an equitable distribution of the debtor's assets. The court achieved this goal by
basing its decision on the construction of the statutory language
of the Bankruptcy Code and obeying the order of Congress to
decide valuation issues case-by-case. It therefore ruled that most
vehicles in Chapter 13 cases where the debtor proposes to retain
the vehicle are to be valued at their wholesale price, and at
higher standards where a vehicle is used as part of a going
concern.
The Mitchell decision served the lower courts' need for
clear direction on the issue of valuation and and gave other circuit courts a clear analytical approach upon which to base their
decisions. However, the rule announced in Mitchell is limited to
a specific situation: valuation of vehicles for purposes of confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan of reorganization. Left unaddressed
are valuation standards where other types of collateral are involved and how Bankruptcy Code sections other than 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325 are to be analyzed in conjunction with 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
131. [d.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a); Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 561.
133.. Supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/7

24

Clark: Bankruptcy Law

1993]

BANKRUPTCY LAW

33

Mitchell may be extended to control any Chapter 13 case
where a debtor proposes to retain property used as collateral for
a loan. The bankruptcy tradition of analogizing between chap. ters would support extending Mitchell's holding to such cases,
absent a specific statutory prohibition.
In Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit successfully settled an issue
that had yet to reach the circuit court level, stayed faithful to
the philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code, and reached a correct
result for the right reasons.
.
Edwin S. Clark*
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